



# RISK MANAGEMENT APPLIED TO CIRCUIT SHUNTING



OCTOBER 2017

SNCF SAFETY DIRECTORATE – IRSC 2017 – RISK MANAGEMENT APPLIED TO CIRCUIT SHUNTING

## ***PRESENTATION CONTENTS***

- **Shunting - the basics**
- **The undesired event: de-shunting**
- **The four main causes of de-shunting**
- **Incident analysis**
- **Detecting de-shunting**
- **The Sainte-Pazanne accident: a trigger event for efforts to eradicate de-shunting**
- **Introduction of a project mode based on a risk assessment process**
- **The three types of actions implemented**


## SHUNTING - THE BASICS

The **TRACK CIRCUIT**: a train detection device.

The train's axles **SHUNT** the track circuit running between the two rails.



The functions performed by the **TRACK CIRCUIT** and by **SHUNTING** of traffic on the track facilitate the signalling functions that prevent rear-end and head-on collisions, derailments and collisions at level crossings.

Countries using such devices for traffic detection include: France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan.



## SHUNTING - THE BASICS

### HOW A TRACK CIRCUIT WORKS



## THE UNDESIRED EVENT: DE-SHUNTING

- **DE-SHUNTING** is the undesired event associated with operating a **TRACK CIRCUIT**.
- **DE-SHUNTING** is the term used to describe a high level of impedance in the contact between rail and wheel, which generates electrical behaviour in the **TRACK CIRCUIT** so that the circuit believes that there is no contact between the rail and the wheel when traffic is in fact physically present in the area.
- Hence, **DE-SHUNTING** can cause safety-critical incidents if its **CAUSES** and **CONSEQUENCES** are not managed.

# THE FOUR MAIN CAUSES OF DE-SHUNTING

- OXIDATION OF RAIL/WHEEL CONTACT



- EXCESSIVE SANDING




- AUTUMNAL CONTAMINATION



- INADEQUATE VEHICLE RESPONSE





Causes des déshuntages 2016




- Amalgame noir
- Sablage
- Oxydation due à un tonnage insuffisant
- Réponse insuffisante engin
- Autres causes ( défaut cdv,...)
- Cause non identifiée \*

# INCIDENT ANALYSIS

- 45 de-shunting incidents on average each year
- 80% of de-shunting incidents occur in the autumn
- 3 critical de-shunting incidents in 2016



## DE-SHUNTING TRENDS 2015-2017



\* End of September

- Covered and protected by technical measures
- Covered and protected by operational measures
- Critical
- Classification pending



## **DETECTING DE-SHUNTING**

The following are involved in the detection of de-shunting or suspected de-shunting:

- **operators:**
  - the train dispatcher (e.g. failure to release route, distance indicator light turning off or turning to white, etc.)
  - the controller
  - the driver (e.g. signalling interval)
  - electrical service or other staff (e.g. seeing a barrier at a level crossing being raised too early)
  
- **the maintenance support computer system (remote monitoring)**
- **recordings from computerised switching stations**
- **the recorders put in place by Infrastructure Management to monitor signalling systems**
- **the track circuits' residual voltage recorders**

## ***THE SAINTE-PAZANNE ACCIDENT: A TRIGGER EVENT FOR EFFORTS TO ERADICATE DE-SHUNTING***


- **Track spread following de-shunting on a switching zone**
- **Highlighted the impact of autumnal contamination**
- **Two immediate measures:**
- **Introduction of a shunting safety protocol**
  - **Circulation of X73500 trains forbidden in interlockings with route recording if operating as single units; verification of a minimum of 2 trains on the route**
  - **Verification of cleanliness of the tyre treads of certain stock**
- **Introduction of a shunting system taskforce (project mode)**




## A PROJECT MODE BASED ON A RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS (1/2)

Prevention barriers

Protective barriers



# A PROJECT MODE BASED ON A RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS (2/2)




# SHUNTING ACTION PLAN

- I. Preventive actions to prevent shunt failure
- II. Corrective actions of the consequences of shunt failure
- III. Prospective actions for knowledge of the rail/wheel contact system

Preventive actions



Corrective actions




Prospective actions

# PREVENTIVE ACTIONS/INADEQUATE RESPONSE FROM VEHICLE

## Inductive loop shunt assisting device




## Scrubber



# PREVENTIVE ACTIONS/OXIDATION

High voltage impulse track circuit




Rail grinding



Rustproof rails



# PREVENTIVE ACTIONS/POLLUTION




## Cleaning of certain vehicles' wheels





# PREVENTIVE ACTIONS/SANDING



## Cleaning of rails and track




Cleaning with high-pressure water



Cleaning by brushing




# MITIGATING ACTIONS/RISK OF COLLISION AT LEVEL CROSSINGS



Treadles for level crossings with track circuit warnings




# MITIGATING ACTIONS/RISK OF HEAD-ON COLLISION



Delay of 45 seconds for route release mechanism




# PROSPECTIVE ACTIONS/ANTICIPATING DE-SHUNTING



- **Safety studies:** mitigating actions are required for around 30 sections of line identified as critical by safety studies.
- **Methodology for de-shunting analysis and risk management**
- **Development and testing of a residual voltage measurement instrument**



# PROSPECTIVE ACTIONS/PREVENTING DE-SHUNTING





Development and testing of a next generation inductive loop shunt assisting device


Development and testing of a wheel brush

Development and testing of an on-board anti-contamination device

UIC device (Marc Antoni): Research on improving track circuit receivers



# SHUNTING AND SYSTEMS



## IN ADDITION TO RISK ANALYSES

- **A local criticality analysis methodology**
- **See presentation by Jean-Luc Wybo**