#### international Engineering Safety Management – Assessment Accreditation Scheme

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#### Overview

This paper introduces a scheme for independent safety assessment accreditation within railways, in line with the CENELEC suite of Railway Application standards, as part of the international Engineering Safety Management (iESM) guidance for the worldwide railway industry. The iESM Guidance was developed by the TPD Group and reviewed by an international Working Group of senior practitioners, supported by MTR Corporation Hong Kong. It was presented at IRSC in Vancouver in 2013. It is freely available from <a href="www.intesm.org">www.intesm.org</a> and includes guidance on performing Independent Assessment.

#### iESM Accreditation – Why?

The role of the Independent Assessor is critical to assure satisfactory evidence of safety before operation or after modification. Whilst the iESM guidance and others have described the process of independent assessment and even listed the expected qualifications of an Assessor, this work was carried out to address a rather glaring gap in assurance of the engineering safety management lifecycle actives. Whilst there are various licensing schemes in rail (e.g. signaling-related activities), there has never been a recognized accreditation scheme for safety assessors.

Railtrack in UK, and for a time their successors Network Rail, operated an in-house scheme that provided accreditation to companies providing independent safety assessment services. Since then in Europe various mandatory accreditation schemes for Assessment Bodies (under the Common Safety Methods for Risk Assessment), Notified Bodies (under Interoperability Regulations) or Design Bodes (under National Notified Technical Rules) have been developed. Whilst similar, none of these covers the risk-based independent safety assessment role and all of them bring a significant overhead of accreditation assurance.

The emerging draft (at the time of writing) of CENELEC EN50126-2 includes a set of key competences for an Assessor including having an

"acceptance/license" from a recognized safety authority. The standard offers no further guidance on what is expected or how it may be achieved. The iESM Accreditation Scheme aims to meet this requirement.

#### Company or Individual?

Existing accreditation arrangements such as they are aim at accrediting organizations rather than individuals. Typically companies will have internal processes for ensuring that staff or contractors are competent for the work they are assigned to. In the Railtrack / Network Rail example a competency matrix was used to indicate one of 5 levels of ability against a long list of tools & techniques, roles and lifecycle activities. This is supported by a record of training (although as discussed below not any ISA-specific training) and education. Supporting processes require these to be kept up to date. There is no assessment of any such training nor any measure of the currency of any claimed experience.

That process was defined to meet the needs of one, albeit significant, large client. It is not easily transferable to the needs of another client and could lead to multiple versions of similar but different matrices existing. Nor, for the individual are they easily transportable to other companies.

Thus such corporate arrangements, whilst important, are limited in that they:

- do not necessarily meet the needs of particular projects (which is surely the core requirement);
- maybe single client focused;
- are rather subjective.

The European schemes for AsBo focus heavily on the processes (such as managing certificates) and organization of the company (such as management control). This requires substantial overhead and demonstration of compliance through audit. The effect has been that only larger companies can achieve and maintain these certifications whilst smaller niche providers are excluded. Further it turns independent assessment into a product line which means companies specialize in provided the service to the exclusion of providing safety engineering services on projects to demonstrate safety. Both these factors have an inadvertent emerging property of increasing cost without any demonstrable improvement in safety assurance.

Achieving the iESM mark will depend on the context and the environment in which the independent assessment is performed and also on the working culture of the organization. In a commercial environment the standard of competence is the standard of work expected to satisfy a number of requirements, including business objectives as well as the more obvious safety requirements.

## Requirements for a scheme

The new iESM approach reflects that the delivery of effective safety assessment relies fundamentally on the skill, experience, competence and independence of individuals sometimes working as teams, supported by the processes of corporate entities, rather than the other way around. These requirements drawn for EN50126 and iESM are shown in the table below.

No	Requirement
1	Be competent in the domain/technologies where independent
	assessment is carried out
2	Have acceptance / license from a recognized safety authority
3	Have / strive to continually gain sufficient levels of experience in
	the safety principles and the application of the principles within
	the application domain
4	Be competent to check that a suitable method or combination of
	methods in a given context have been applied
5	Be competent in understanding the relevant safety, human
	resource, technical and quality management processes in
	fulfilling the requirements of the EN 50126
6	Be competent in independent assessment
	approaches/methodologies
7	Have analytical thinking ability and good observation skills
8	Be capable of combining different sources and types of evidence
	and synthesize an overall view about fitness for purpose or
	constraints and limitations on application
9	Have an understanding of the overall system including its
	application environment
10	Understand the requirements of EN 50126
11	Professional status in an engineering or scientific discipline
	relevant to the system or equipment
12	Prior experience as an independent assessor or safety engineer
	for a minimum of 5 years in areas relevant to the system or
	equipment
13	A commitment to safety

No	Requirement
14	The flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and the
	perform assessment tasks efficiently and to minimize wastage of
	physical and virtual resources

Where an independent assessment is carried out by a team, the team as a whole should possess the technical knowledge and experience and the Lead Assessor as an individual should possess the personal qualifications and attributes.

## iESM Approach

The iESM approach offers a combination of some company processes and the expertise of individuals demonstrated largely by self-assessment and professional registration.

Companies can carry the iESM accreditation mark as a service provider but only if they deploy suitably qualified and experienced assessors. Assessors can achieve the iESM accreditation mark but only if operating within a minimum organizational framework (not necessarily their own company) and relevant professional registration. These marks can be achieved by meeting the requirements in EN50126-2 as expanded by the guidance in iESM where necessary.

For individuals there are three requirements which have been expanded into competencies by the Institution of Engineering and Technology and British Computer Society in their publication "Safety Competency and Commitment":

- Behavioural competence including for example maintaining independence
- Technical competence e.g. safety engineering and risk acceptance techniques, assessment and audit, general consultancy skills
- Knowledge legal requirements, domain, system, technology, specialist areas

#### **Professional Registration**

The iESM approach requires that a Lead Assessor be professionally recognized, for example Chartered Engineer or Professional Engineer status in Australia. The professional institutions have robust and established processes to recognize those with an appropriate standing within the industry. Membership includes a commitment to a Code of

Conduct which effectively covers the behavioral Independent Assessment issues relating for example to conflict of interest and objectivity. Other Assessors on a team do not need to be corporate members of institutions allowing for flexibility and professional development, however they will need to sign an identical Code of Conduct.

#### Technical Competence

To date approximately a thousand people have taken the iESM Practitioner's course and most have passed the exam at the end of it.

Their achievement is recorded on the iESM website (see <a href="www.intesm.org/training-apprived-practioners.html">www.intesm.org/training-apprived-practioners.html</a>. A similar list of Independent Assessment practitioners is being developed following the pilot. Passing the iESM Practitioner's Course demonstrates an understanding of the iESM requirements – including, at a high level - independent assessment and the requirements of the CENELEC family of Railway application standards.

Once this has been undertaken and the exam passed, an iESM Independent Assessment course, developed around Application Note 4 on <a href="www.intesm.org">www.intesm.org</a> develops the specific competences and gives classroom experience of performing assessment. The course is intensive and covers:

- The need for a Independent Assessment and how it can reduce project and safety risk;
- Key Independent Assessment concepts and terminology;
- Planning an Independent Assessment;
- Good practice tools and techniques for Independent Assessment and apply the AN4 guidance on implementing them, including:
  - o Deliverable assessment
  - Observation categorization
  - Safety audit overview
  - Diverse analysis
  - Vertical Slice Analysis
  - Sampling
  - Managing outcomes

More detail is shown here

http://www.intesm.org/ISA\_training\_overview\_01.pdf The exam is deliberately harder than that for iESM Practitioner. Success in the

course exam is good evidence for a number of the competencies identified below.

Self Assessment – three levels

There are four key competencies that apply to almost all projects:

- acquiring an appreciation of the scope and context of the assessment;
- selecting and planning a cost-effective assessment strategy;
- gathering relevant evidence;
- forming a judgement including managing any outcomes.

Many competency frameworks define levels using terminology which can be confusing and divisive. The iESM Scheme uses three numeric levels.

Level 1 is the base level which indicates that the Assessor has sufficient knowledge and understanding of good practice to be able to work on assessment tasks without placing an excessive burden on other consultants which might compromise safety or quality. Level One Assessors may not have had previous experience of working on rail industry projects. It may therefore be necessary to extrapolate from evidence of technical skills derived from a non-rail-related project environment. Their competencies are likely to have been developed through targeted training and work on non-assessment projects.

At Level 2, the Assessor has sufficient knowledge and understanding of good practice and has sufficiently demonstrable experience, to be able to work on the tasks associated with the overall activity without the need for detailed supervision. A Level Two Assessor will maintain their knowledge and be aware of the current developments in the context in which they work. A Level Two Assessor may be required to perform detailed checks on the work carried out by a Level One Assessor.

At Level 3, the Assessor has sufficient understanding of why things are done in certain ways, and sufficiently demonstrable skills, to be able to undertake overall responsibility for leading a task or project. A Level Three Assessor will be familiar with the ways in which systems or products have failed in the past. They will keep abreast of technologies, architectures, application solutions, standards, and regulatory requirements. They will have sufficient breadth of experience, knowledge and understanding to be able to work in novel

situations. They are able to deal with a multiplicity of problems under pressure without jeopardising safety or quality issues.

There are six specific elements within the Independent Assessment competence (excluding audit) as shown in the table below linked to the three levels to aid self assessment. Note one key competence is auditing. This is not covered by the iESM scheme as there are many comprehensive auditing recognition schemes existing.

Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
Scope &	Acquires an	Level 1: Understands broadly
Content	appreciation of the	the use and scope of the
Appreciation	product or system	product or system in question
	and the application	within the wider railway.
	to which it is being	Level 2: Can describe the
	put. Establishes	safety implications and
	the scope and	functions of the system and
	objectives of an	product, and how these relate
	assessment, such	to the wider railway in
	that all necessary	providing acceptable levels of
	requirements of a	risk. Can use this
	safety assessment	understanding to identify key
	are capable of	aspects of the product or
	being satisfied.	system to be assessed.
		Level 3: Understands how the
		wider railway interacts with the
		product or system under
		question, and can see how
		changes to the system
		boundaries or in approach
		might affect the safety
		argument. Uses this deep
		system knowledge to formulate
		a strong understanding of the
		scope of the assessment.

Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
Assessment	Selects an	Level 1: Understands that an
Strategy	assessment	IA Plan contains a description of
Selection and	strategy involving	the review, audit, analysis and
Planning	a range of	test witnessing work required
	techniques and	to form a judgement on the
	measures which	safety of a product or system.
	are capable of	Appreciates the need for
	yielding sufficient	different levels of rigour.
	evidence in a cost-	<b>Level 2</b> : Shows understanding
	effective manner	of the different assessment
	to enable a robust	techniques and their strengths
	judgment to be	and weaknesses, including how
	made regarding	they might be performed in
	the safety of a	practice. Has written several IA
	product or system.	Plans, or similar types of plan
	Encapsulates the	for conventional systems and
	assessment	low/medium integrity systems.
	strategy in a	Level 3: Has reviewed and
	workable plan.	signed off ISA Plans. Can
		develop an assessment strategy
		for a novel and/or high integrity
		products or systems.
		Understands the difference
		between techniques and how
		some combination of
		techniques may not be effective
		in providing a proper
		assessment of key safety
		aspects of products or systems,
		and how other combinations
		may not be cost effective.

Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
Reviewing	Accurately and	Level 1: Able to perform
Safety	systematically	reviews on safety cases, hazard
Documentation	reviews	procedures, safety plans, and
	documents,	produce a relevant set of
	supported by	observations.
	discussions to	Level 2: Has performed
	clarify ambiguities	reviews and produces relevant
	and understanding	observations on quality of the
	where necessary,	information in the documents,
	to obtain evidence	and highlighting items that
	to support a	would normally be expected to
	judgment on	be included. Can look outside
	whether a product	the system boundary. Able to
	or system has	categorise observations in line
	satisfied its	with the classification system. <b>Level 3</b> : Has reviewed and
	functional safety	
	requirements.	signed off reports on reviews of
		safety documentation and can identify astute observations on
		safety documents including
		those which could have a
		significant impact on the overall
		safety argument for the
		product/system. Can recognise
		common issues and reflect that
		in the observations made. Is
		able to categorise observations
		so that the key issues to be
		addressed are highlighted and
		can determine when large
		numbers of lower category
		observations should be
		reflected by higher
		categorisations. Understands
		the problems with producing
		safety documentation based on
		issues faced when working on
		safety engineering projects and
		can apply this knowledge to
		assessments.

safety analyses. what an ISA may wish to determine when performing an	Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
safety analyses. Identifies, where necessary, the requirements for further safety analysis to obtain evidence to support a judgment on whether a product or system has satisfied its functional safety objectives.  safety analyses.  What an ISA may wish to determine when performing an assessment on a safety analysis for a product or system.  Understands the difference between Cause, Hazard, Accident and Consequence.  Level 2: Appreciates the difference between HAZID and HAZAN studies, including detailed FMECA and FTA analyses. Has performed reviews on safety analyses and hazard logs and picked out relevant observations. Can identify confusions between Hazard, Cause and Consequence.  Level 3: Has experience in performing safety analyses for	Assessing	Determines the	Level 1: Is aware of the
Identifies, where necessary, the requirements for further safety analysis to obtain evidence to support a judgment on whether a product or system has satisfied its functional safety objectives.  Identifies, where necessary, the requirements for further safety analysis for a product or system.  Understands the difference between Cause, Hazard, Accident and Consequence.  Level 2: Appreciates the difference between HAZID and HAZAN studies, including detailed FMECA and FTA analyses. Has performed reviews on safety analyses and hazard logs and picked out relevant observations. Can identify confusions between Hazard, Cause and Consequence.  Level 3: Has experience in performing safety analyses for	Safety Analysis	completeness of	purpose of safety analysis, and
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a range or systems and			1.
			products, and can identify holes
in safety work in terms of			1 .
providing a full argument that			1
the system or product is safe.			·
Aware of how the risk			
assessment process feeds into			
the final safety argument and			
can take a view on how the			
			iESM processes can be tailored
to meet a project's specific			1
needs.			

Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
Producing	Produces succinct	Level 1: Able to form a
assessment	and	conclusion based on a list of
reports	comprehensive	findings, and write up a body of
including	reports on	assessment or audit work to
formation of an	assessment work	produce a good quality report.
overall	carried out	Level 2: Understands the
judgment on	containing an	relative importance of different
the safety of a	unambiguous	findings from the assessment
product or	judgment, through	work carried out and can
system, or	a reasoned and	balance them to produce a
process used.	documented	considered judgement on the
	argument, on	safety assurance of a system or
	whether a product,	product. Has produced several
	system or process	assessment reports.
	has satisfied its	Level 3: Has helped in or
	safety objectives.	produced the overall
		conclusions on an assessment
		project where many different
		people have had an input, and
		produced a balanced, well-
		written report. Is able to show
		how the report stood up to
		scrutiny and challenge from the
		project or a third party (e.g.
		regulator or approval body).

Title	Description	Typical Performance Level
Managing	Contributes as	Level 1: able to agree closure
Outcomes	required to the	of individual observations
	management of	raised by themselves based on
	the results of a	an acceptable project response.
	safety assessment,	Level 2: has managed the
	such that any	resolution of observations
	necessary actions	raised by a set of assessors and
	are addressed and	able to reach compromises in
	appropriately	areas where there is some
	resolved.	dispute, without affecting the
		level of safety integrity.
		Level 3: Has experience of
		presenting assessment results
		to potentially hostile projects
		and acceptance bodies and is
		able to negotiate a way
		forward. Keeps the safety
		principles of the assessment to
		the fore when reaching
		agreements while being flexible
		in agreeing an appropriate way
		forward. Is firm in defending
		key assessment findings. Able
		to remain calm and controlled
		when under significant
		pressure.

# Domain Knowledge

The generic domain knowledge is dealt with in a similar way the Technical Competence described above using three levels:

- Level 1: The individual possesses a basic understanding of the Domain Element (at least 80% of the Element), including its scope, function and general principles of operation/application. Capable of placing the Element in the context of the wider railway and is aware of the critical/important interfaces. May not have worked on projects involving this Element before.
- Level 2: The individual possesses a detailed understanding of the Element, including key failure mechanisms and operation under degraded or abnormal conditions, having worked on one or more projects specific to, or inclusive of, the Element. They have had

- direct experience of at least 80% of the topics within the Element; any exclusions and developing specialisms should be stated.
- Level 3: The individual possesses an authoritative understanding of the Element, having been involved in several phases of the system lifecycle, including development/design, manufacture, installation, operation/use and maintenance/modification, for at least 80% of the topics within the Element. Any exclusions and specialisms should be stated.

For each Element, the level of knowledge and experience is expected to reflect the understanding of the underlying principles, knowledge of relevant standards across various railway administrations (specifically noting specialisms and exclusions) and relevant experience of the product, system, equipment or process.

The '80% rule' described above is a broad 'rule of thumb'. It is *not* intended that consultants calculate the exact proportion of the topics within the Element that they understand. It *is* intended to be used pragmatically. For example, in the 'widget' Element, there may be twenty different types of widget, but only five are commonly used; therefore understanding of four of the five commonly used widgets would fulfill the 80% rule.

Whether a consultant can be considered to have attained a particular level is ultimately judged at the discretion of the Responsible Manager.

## **Demonstration of Competency**

The role of the designated "Responsible Manager" is key within the organization. With an individual working alone this role may be performed by the iESM Secretariat. The Responsible Manager will make the judgment as to whether an individual is competent at the appropriate level, even if the individual has not actually performed the role before. This might be on the basis of what else they have done, what they have experienced, the efficacy of any training they may have received plus other relevant technical and behavioral abilities.

In the absence of past assessment experience, the Responsible Manager will seek other assurance through, for instance:

- a demonstration that the Assessor would be able to apply the competency correctly in a hypothetical situation (can be applied);
- the ability to answer questions pertaining to the competency based on past experience (can be tested);
- evidence of having been trained in that particular competency (has been shown).

The nature of the evidence to demonstrate competence needs to be considered. It is acknowledged that documentary workplace records are not always available and sometimes access to them may be inappropriate so the Responsible Manager can allow other forms of evidence at their discretion. Other forms of evidence that might be considered are:

- assignment and/or project records;
- documentary records;
- workplace observation;
- competence test (see below);
- witness testimony;
- oral testimony.

It is certainly not a requirement of the iESM scheme that copies should be made of evidence or separately filed, ready to be produced on demand. There needs to be adequate referencing to evidence, but except where there is some doubt or disagreement, it is not necessary to physically obtain the evidence itself.

#### Conclusion

This new iESM Accreditation scheme is available for individuals and independent assessment service providing companies. It has been piloted in Australia and should fill a gap in the assurance arrangements for clients and suppliers alike. It aims to be "light-touch" but give substantial credibility to the assessors who achieve the mark through a combination of training, experience and demonstrable competence.

Refinements will be made as experience grows and in response to emerging requirements from the international standards.